MAYOR'S STRATEGIC COMMAND TO REDUCE MURDERS

2012-2013 Summary Report: Murders and Non-Fatal Shootings New Orleans, LA

Released: July 14, 2014

Table of Contents

REPORT OVERVIEW 6
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 7
BACKGROUND 8
Figure 1. Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders- Organizational Structure, 2013... 9
Figure 2. Strategic Command 2012-2013: How It Worked 10
Table 1. Summary of Action Team Participation, 2012-2013 13
2012-2013: ACTION ITEMS AND PROCESSES 15
2014: STRATEGIC COMMAND TRANSITIONS TO THE OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATION (CITY OF NEW ORLEANS) 19
NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS 20
Graph 1. Gender Distribution by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 21
Graph 2. Race/Ethnicity Distribution by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 21
Graph 3. Age Group Distribution by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 22
Graph 4. Estimated Unemployment Rates by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 23
Table 2. Estimated Unemployment Rates and Percent of Residents Earning a Salary or Wage by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 23
Graph 5. Type of Household Income by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 24
Graph 6. Average Annual Household Income by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 24
Graph 7. Economic Indicators by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 25
Graph 8. Vacant and Owner Occupied Housing Units by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 26
Graph 9. Educational Attainment by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide (Residents 18 Years of Age and Older) 27
Table 3. Educational Attainment by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide (Residents 18 years of Age and Older) 27
Graph 10. Household Composition by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide 28
SUMMARY OF MURDER AND NON-FATAL SHOOTING ANALYSES 2012-2013 29
Graph 11. Number of Murders by Year, 2007-2013 32
Graph 12. Number of Murders by Month, 2012-2013 33
Graph 13. Distribution of Murders by Police District 2012-2013 34
Graph 14. Number of Murder Incidents and Victims by Target versus Non-Target Neighborhood, 2012-2013 34
Graph 15. Percent of Murder Victims by Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013 35
Graph 16. Percent of Victims Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Murder Occurred, 2012-2013 35
Graph 17. Percent of Murder Suspects by Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013 36
Graph 18. Percent of Suspects Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Murder Occurred, 2012-2013 37
Graph 19. Murder Case Distribution by Day of the Week, 2012-2013 38
Graph 20. Murder Case Distribution by Time of Day, 2012-2013 38

Graph 21. Murder Cases by Location, 2012-2013 39
Graph 22. Weapons Used in Murder Cases, 2012-2013 39
Graph 23. Identified Motives in Murder Cases, 2012-2013 40
Graph 24. Murder Was Known To Be Associated With A Separate Murder Incident....40
Graph 25. Percent of Murder Victims by Gender, 2012-2013 41
Graph 26. Percent of Murder Victims by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013....42
Graph 27. Percent of Murder Victims by Age Group, 2012-2013 42
Graph 28. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2012-2013 43
Graph 29. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2012-2013....43
Graph 30. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013....44
Graph 31. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013....44
Graph 32. Percent of Cleared Murder Cases, 2012-2013 (Through January 6, 2014) 45
Graph 33. Percent of Murder Suspects by Gender, 2012-2013 46
Graph 34. Percent of Murder Suspects by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013....46
Graph 35. Percent of Murder Suspects by Age Group, 2012-2013 47
Graph 36. Relative Age of Murder Suspect versus Victim, 2012-2013....47
Graph 37. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2012-2013 48
Graph 38. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2012-2013....48
Graph 39. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013....49
Graph 40. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013....49
Table 4. Number of Murders and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Police District ..50
Table 5. Number of Murders and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Zip Code 50
Table 6. Number of Murders and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Neighborhood Where Incident Occurred....51
Table 7. Percent of Murders Within Age Group By Day of the Week 2012-2013 53
NON-FATAL SHOOTINGS 2012-2013 55
Graph 41. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings, 2009-2013....55
Graph 42. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings By Month, 2012-2013....56
Graph 43. Distribution of Non-Fatal Shootings by Police District, 2012-2013....57
Graph 44. Number of Non-Fatal Shooting Incidents and Victims by Target versus Non-Target Neighborhood, 2012-2013....57
Graph 45. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims By Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013 58

Graph 46. Percent of Victims Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Non-Fatal Shooting Occurred, 2012-2013 58
Graph 47. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects By Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013 59
Graph 48. Percent of Suspects Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Non-Fatal Shooting Occurred, 2012-2013 60
Graph 49. Non-Fatal Shooting Case Distribution by Day of the Week, 2012-2013 61
Graph 50. Non-Fatal Shooting Case Distribution by Time of Day, 2012-2013 61
Graph 51. Non-Fatal Shooting Cases by Location, 2012-2013 62
Graph 52. Type of Firearm Used in Non-Fatal Shooting Cases, 2012-2013 62
Graph 53. Identified Motives in Non-Fatal Shooting Cases, 2012-2013 63
Graph 54. Non-Fatal Shooting Was Known to be Related to A Separate Murder Incident 63
Graph 55. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims by Gender, 2012-2013 64
Graph 56. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013 65
Graph 57. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims By Age Group, 2012-2013 65
Graph 58. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2013 66
Graph 59. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2013 67
Graph 60. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2013 67
Graph 61. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2013 68
Graph 62. Percent of Cleared Non-Fatal Shooting Cases, 2012-2013 69
Graph 63. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects by Gender, 2012-2013 69
Graph 64. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013 70
Graph 65. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects by Age Group, 2012-2013 70
Graph 66. Relative Age of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspect versus Victim, 2012-2013 71
Graph 67. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2013 72
Graph 68. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2013 72
Graph 69. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2013 73
Graph 70. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2013 73
Table 8. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Police District 74
Table 9. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Zip Code 75
Table 10. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Neighborhood 75

MAPS: MURDER INCIDENTS 80
Map 1. GIS Map of Murder Locations, 2012-2013 80
Map 2. NOPD Police District Boundaries 81
Map 3. New Orleans Zip Code Boundaries 82
Map 4. GIS Map of Murder Locations- Central City, 2012-2013 83
Map 5. GIS Map of Murder Locations- Little Woods, 2012-2013 84
Map 6. GIS Map of Murder Locations- 7th Ward, 2012-2013 85
Map 7. GIS Map of Murder Locations- St. Claude, 2012-2013 86
Map 8. GIS Map of Murder Locations- St. Roch, 2012-2013 87
MAPS: NON-FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENTS 88
Map 9. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations, 2012-2013 88
Map 10. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- Central City, 2012-2013 89
Map 11. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- Little Woods, 2012-2013 90
Map 12. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- 7th Ward, 2012-2013 91
Map 13. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- St. Claude, 2012-2013 92
Map 14. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- St. Roch, 2012-2013 93

REPORT OVERVIEW

The Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders is an initiative of NOLA FOR LIFE, the City of New Orleans' Comprehensive Murder Reduction Strategy. The Strategic Command, which builds upon the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission, is a multi-level and multi-disciplinary collaborative model that seeks to not only improve community safety, but also to increase the quality of life of all residents. The model has been identified by the Department of Justice as a best practice and, for Milwaukee, has been instrumental in realizing a significant reduction in murder.

In New Orleans, the Strategic Command focuses on prevention by convening murder and non-fatal shooting trend reviews with community leaders and a diverse array of representatives from the criminal justice system, schools, faith-based organizations, neighborhood groups, and other community groups and service provider agencies. The Strategic Command supports implementation and evaluation of recommendations that come from the murder trend reviews, maintains a comprehensive database of murders and non-fatal shootings, and provides technical assistance and capacity building services to criminal justice and community service professionals. The end goal is to get ahead of crime, identify patterns, and intervene to prevent violent crime from occurring.

This report provides a background history of the Strategic Command and an overview of the organizational structure from 2012-2013. Key accomplishments of the Strategic Command during 2012-2013 are highlighted, including prevention and intervention efforts with school-based youth, enforcement and prosecution, coordinated programming and service delivery, and service as a community resource. The report also examines key neighborhood indicators and offers comparison of city-wide characteristics versus characteristics of the NOLA FOR LIFE's five major target neighborhoods in 2012-2013 (Central City, Little Woods, Seventh Ward, St. Claude, and St. Roch).

Finally, analyses of murder and non-fatal shooting data from January 2012-December 2013 are summarized. The report provides incidence data (e.g., the number of new murders and non-fatal shootings), as well as data on the contextual environment of murders and non-fatal shootings, characteristics of victims, and characteristics of arrested suspects in cleared cases. The data analyses were conducted by staff from the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders supported by the City of New Orleans and the Mayor's Innovation Delivery Team.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are numerous individuals and agencies throughout the City of New Orleans and across the state that we must thank for their support and partnership.

We would especially like to thank the members of our Executive Planning Team. We are incredibly grateful for their time, assistance, and strategic thinking in establishing the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders. New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu, Former Criminal Justice Commissioner James Carter, Former Health Commissioner Dr. Karen DeSalvo, New Orleans Police Superintendent Ronal Serpas, Former United States Attorney James Letten, and Lynn Overmann from the U.S. Department of Justice all were instrumental in the growth of the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders in New Orleans.

We also extend gratitude to all of the community leaders, law enforcement personnel, employees of the City New Orleans, and others who have committed time and effort to one of the Action Teams of the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders in New Orleans: Executive Action Team, Criminal Justice Action Team, Community Action Team, and R.E.S.E.T. Action Team.

We thank the New Orleans Police Department and the Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine for providing office space, equipment, and other support for Strategic Command endeavors.

We further thank Dr. Mallory O'Brien, Founder and Executive Director of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission and her staff who provided training, technical assistance, and support for the development of the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders.

Staff for the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders includes Director of Research Dr. David Seal, New Orleans Police Officer Donna Smith, and Research Staff Maxime Kumler and Sarah Yancey. We also thank Amy Cavigli, Mallory Gill, and Chris Gunther for their earlier contributions to data analyses presented in this report.

Special thanks to the Mayor's Innovation Delivery Team for their guidance and support.

PERMISSIONS

This City of New Orleans report may be reprinted and distributed. If excerpts from this report are used in other publications, funding submissions, or other such documents, you are required to properly cite the report as noted below.

CITATION

Seal, D.W., Yancey, S., Kumler, M., & Smith, D.M. (2014, February). *2012-2013 Summary Report: Murders and Non-Fatal Shootings*. Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders, Office of Criminal Justice Coordination, Office of the Mayor, New Orleans, LA.

BACKGROUND

In 2011, the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission received funding from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services at the United States Department of Justice to expand its Homicide Review model to five other cities in the United States. New Orleans was selected as one of the first two seed cities.

In July 2011, Dr. Mallory O'Brien, Founder and Executive Director of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission, and her team met with key leaders in New Orleans to introduce the model and begin discussion of its adaptation for local use. The initial Leadership Team for New Orleans was comprised of New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu, Former Criminal Justice Commissioner James Carter, Former Health Commissioner Dr. Karen DeSalvo, New Orleans Police Superintendent Ronal Serpas, Former United States Attorney James Letten, and Lynn Overmann from the U.S. Department of Justice.

After a series of initial meetings, a delegation of key leadership from New Orleans traveled to Milwaukee to observe proceedings of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission, and learn more about their analytic processes. Subsequently, a two-day training workshop was held October 13-14, 2011 in New Orleans. The purpose of this workshop was to formally present the model to a broader stakeholder audience. The training was attended by an array of governmental, law enforcement, academic, and community provider stakeholders. In all, 35 different agencies were invited to participate.

Following this initial training workshop, the Leadership Team finalized the organizational structure of the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders. Based on analyses of murder incidence by neighborhood in prior years, evaluation of available resources in various neighborhoods, and consideration of geographic proximity, it was decided that the Strategic Command would give particular focus in 2012 to four neighborhoods which have accounted for about 30-35% of all murders in New Orleans in recent years. These four neighborhoods were: Central City, Seventh Ward, St. Claude, and St. Roch.

The Strategic Command then held a series of inaugural Action Team meetings. The Executive Action Team held its inaugural meeting in December 2011 to initiate implementation of the initiative. In January 2012, four additional Action Team meetings were held: Criminal Justice, Community Provider, R.E.S.E.T., and Re-Entry-Workforce. Sixty-four distinct individuals representing 42 distinct agencies attended one or more of the inaugural Action Team meetings.

In September 2012, the Community Provider and Re-Entry Action Teams were merged into the newly named Community Action Team. Additionally, beginning in January 2013, Little Woods was added as a neighborhood of focus given the high number of murders and non-fatal shootings that occurred in this area during 2012.

ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW 2012-2013

As indicated above, the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders was comprised of four Action Teams in 2013: Executive Action Team, Criminal Justice Action Team, Community Action Team, and R.E.S.E.T. Action Team. Figure 1 below provides a conceptual overview of the Strategic Command's organizational structure in 2013.

Figure 1. Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders- Organizational Structure, 2013

Figure 2 on page 10 illustrates how the Action Team review process progressed from the occurrence of a murder to the development and implementation of action steps or other action items during the 2012-2013 calendar years.

Figure 2. Strategic Command 2012-2013: How It Worked



The emergence of action steps and other action items took many forms and merged through multiple processes. In the next section (beginning on page 16), an overview of some key action items that were addressed by the Action Teams during 2012-2013 are summarized.

The **Executive Action Team** served as the governing body of the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders. This team was made up of senior level members of the Mayor's staff, and other local and federal law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. This group assisted the Mayor in approving, providing resources for, implementing, and monitoring the progress of action plans and action items that came out of the overall Strategic Command process. It was comprised of decision-makers who could:

- Ensure participation/compliance within their agency,
- Attend Executive Action Team meetings,
- Approve action plans and other action items,
- Allocate resources to support action plans and other action items,
- And support implementation and continuation of action plans and other action items.

Agencies who participated in at least one 2012-2013 Executive Action Team meeting were: ATF, City of New Orleans[1], DEA, FBI, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Police, New Orleans Police Department, Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, Orleans Parish School Board, Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office, Recovery School District, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, United States Attorney's Office, and United States Marshalls.

The **Criminal Justice Action Team** was made up of law enforcement agency representatives knowledgeable of crime data, policies, and programs. This team focused on open and closed murder cases in the prior month to share data, identify patterns, and develop action plans to address identified murder patterns. The group also shared appropriate information with other law enforcement agencies about various projects that were on-going and identified ways that different law enforcement agencies could support each other's respective efforts.

Agencies who participated in at least one 2012-2013 Criminal Justice Action Team meeting were: ATF, City of New Orleans, DEA, FBI, HANO Security, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Police, Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission, New Orleans Family Justice Foundation, New Orleans Police Department, Office of Juvenile Justice, Orleans Parish Coroner's Office, Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, Orleans Parish School Board, Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office, Recovery School District, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, United States Attorney's Office, and United States Marshalls.

The **Community Action Team** was made up of non-profit community organizations, social service agencies, and community organizers that work on crime and violence prevention. This group identified issues with service delivery or capacity, identified gaps in existing resources, and made recommendations to improve community-based

[1]Accross all action teams and work groups, the following departments within the City of New Orleans contributed to the Mayor's Strategic Command: the Mayor's Office, Chief Administration Office, Economic Development, Health Department, Homeland Security and the Innovation Delivery Team.

prevention efforts. The group also provided critical feedback about related projects that were being developed, and identified ways in which community providers could support or enhance these efforts. Within the merged Community Action Team, there were four main priority work areas: prevention, intervention, re-entry, and workforce. For each of these areas, separate workgroups were established to address specific recommendations and to develop concrete action proposals (see pages 13-15 for additional details).

Agencies who participated in at least one 2012-2013 Community Action Team meeting (includes pre-merger CPAT and RWAT attendees) were: Addicted to the Lifestyle, APEX, Archdiocese, Black Chamber of Commerce, CASA, Catholic Charities, CeaseFire New Orleans, Central City Renaissance Alliance, City of New Orleans, Covenant House, Crimestoppers, First NBC, Greater New Orleans Foundation, IDB, Job 1, Justice and Accountability Center of Louisiana, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, Louisiana Coalition of Offender Resources, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Loft Non-Profit, Loyola University, Manifested Miracles, Metropolitan Human Services, More Than One Way Home, New Orleans Black Men and Boys Initiative, New Orleans Business Alliance, New Orleans Business Council, New Orleans Crime Coalition, New Orleans Family Justice Foundation, New Orleans Fatherhood Association, New Orleans Police Department, New Orleans Recreation Development Commission, Nu Visions, Ordinary People, Orleans Parish Public Defender's Office, Orleans Parish School Board, Puentes, Recovery School District, Strong Cities Strong Communities, Time for A Change, Total Community Action, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, Urban Baptist Theological Services, United States Office of Probation and Parole, Urban League of New Orleans, VCAC, VERA Institute of Justice, Voices of the Ex-Offenders, Voices of Experience, Volunteers of America, and Youth Empowerment Project.

Under the direction of NOPD, the **Rapid Engagement of Support in the Event of Trauma (R.E.S.E.T.) Activation Team** aimed to deploy a trauma response team to the surrounding neighborhood of a murder site within 48-96 hours. The R.E.S.E.T. Activation Team assisted surviving witnesses, family members, and other associates of the murder victim who were coping with the aftermath of a violent death. They provided support, comfort and encouragement to nearby community members. They also provided resources and information, made referrals, and answered questions and concerns raised by community members. The R.E.S.E.T. Action Team, under the Strategic Command, provided critical feedback about Activation team field activities, related projects that were being developed, and identified ways in which R.E.S.E.T. members and their agencies could support or enhance these efforts.

Agencies who participated in at least one of the 2012-2013 R.E.S.E.T. Action Team meetings were: Café Reconcile, Catholic Charities, CeaseFire New Orleans, City of New Orleans, Crimestoppers, First Unitarian Universalist Church, New Orleans Police Department, NOPD Chaplain Services, Office of Independent Police Monitor, Orleans

District Attorney's Office, Silence Is Violence, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, and an independent Crisis Intervention Specialist.

In all, 47 Action Team meetings were held during 2012-2013. Across these 47 meetings, 203 distinct individuals representing 69 distinct agencies attended one or more Action Team Meetings. Table 1 below presents more detailed attendance records.

Table 1. Summary of Action Team Participation, 2012-2013

Action Teams 2012-2013	Attended One or More Meetings		Avg. Attendance Per Meeting	
	Agencies	People	Agencies	People
Executive (n=5 meetings)	14	46	12.2	25.2
Criminal Justice (n=17 meetings)	19	95	9.2	18.8
Community Provider (pre-merger: n=4 meetings)	29	41	14.8	17.8
R.E.S.E.T (n=10 meetings)	13	44	7.1	12.3
Re-Entry Workforce (pre-merger: n=4 meetings)	21	31	10.0	12.8
Community (Merged CPAT-RWAT) (n=7 meetings)**	33	57	15.0	19.6

****The Community Provider and Re-Entry Workforce Action Teams were merged in September 2012.**

In support of the Action Teams, five separate **Workgroups** were formed to develop concrete action proposals in response to Action Team recommendations. Forty individuals, representing 28 agencies, contributed to these workgroups which were held separate from the Action Team meetings. Contributing agencies included: APEX, CeaseFire New Orleans, City of New Orleans, Covenant House, Crimestoppers, Family Services of New Orleans, Institute of Mental Hygiene, Job 1, Louisiana Coalition of Offender Resources, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State University, Loyola University, Mayor's Office of Community Development, Mercy Family Center, Metropolitan Human Services, New Orleans Black Men and Boys Initiative, New Orleans Crime Coalition, New Orleans Family Justice Foundation, New Orleans Police Department, Office of Juvenile Justice, Orleans Parish School District, Orleans Public Defenders, Recovery School District, Strong Cities Strong Communities, Total Community Action, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, United States Office of Probation and Parole, and the Vera Institute of Justice.

The ***Re-Entry Workgroup*** aimed to inform a comprehensive re-entry plan that was structured by point of contact with the Criminal Justice system (e.g., arrest to post-release), and included needed program content, description of who should deliver the service(s), determination of whether the service(s) should be delivered generally or targeted at specific groups passing through the Criminal Justice system, a plan for coordination of services throughout a person's Criminal Justice involvement, and other pertinent details. This included development of a concrete work plan to promote job

training, employment, and job retention among individuals leaving the criminal justice system or at high-risk for entry into the Criminal Justice system. This workgroup also drafted a detailed 15-page draft white paper in support of their proposal.

The ***Prevention Workgroup*** aimed broadly to develop infrastructure and safe space to promote community member wellness, growth, and positive mental health. A major focus of this effort was directed toward youth and young adults. Specifically, there was a focus on youth mental health and on gathering data and information on youth mental health services in New Orleans. This process resulted in the creation of a Youth Behavioral Health Resource Guide and a Children's Behavioral Health Dashboard developed through the City Health Department in collaboration with members of this workgroup and other collaborators. The City Health Department subsequently held a series of conference calls to update stakeholders on the status of these tools. Further, a need for accurate and organized truancy and curfew data was identified. Toward this end, the City Health Department obtained truancy data from the Recovery School District which was analyzed to determine which schools should be targeted for resource allocation and/or trainings.

The ***Intervention Workgroup*** aimed to develop community capacity and resources to support and enhance other NOLA FOR LIFE intervention efforts. Toward this end, the workgroup sought to develop a community intake needs and risk assessment tool, identify key training components for uniform implementation of this risk assessment, identify the types of technical assistance needed to promote best practices among community agencies, and promote rigorous and uniform evaluation of related program activities. Eventually, this workgroup was folded into the City of New Orleans' Community of Practice Workgroup where continued development toward this goal is being implemented.

The ***Workforce Workgroup*** aimed to promote and increase job training and employment opportunities. Toward this end, the group sought to (1) identify unfilled job demands in labor trends, (2) establish a data base of employers open to hiring people with criminal records in these unfilled job demand areas, especially those employers with entry level/low skill position, and (3) identify training programs that provide people with criminal records with hard and soft job skills.

Beyond these four Community Action Team workgroups, a ***School Delinquency Workgroup*** was formed in support of the Criminal Justice Action Team. This group developed a proposal to (1) restore SROs in schools with the highest number of delinquency problems (middle and/or high school), (2) systemically and consistently implement specialized wraparound programs for youth who have multiple truancy violations (must include parenting component), and (3) systemically and consistently implement specialized wraparound programs for youth who have multiple curfew violations (must include parenting component). This proposal was part of a three-pronged approach to working with school-based youth who have been involved with violence, and in particular murder or non-fatal shootings, or who have experienced trauma resulting from these events (see pages 16-19 for additional details).

2012-2013: ACTION ITEMS AND PROCESSES

OVERVIEW

A key function of the Action Teams was to develop ideas and concepts into concrete action items that could be implemented toward the goal of reducing the number of murders in New Orleans. Toward this end, the Action Teams had two primary tasks.

One important task was to independently develop major strategic action plans that could be proposed to the Executive Action Team for approval and implementation. Action items were able to address all aspects of the NOLA FOR LIFE portfolio, including prevention, intervention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation. Further, action items were able to address a range of strategies, including capacity building, community improvement, evaluation, marketing, legislative, policy, programmatic, resource development, Strategic Command activities, and systemic recommendations. While some action items formed major projects, many actions items were intended to build a strong foundation in support of more comprehensive efforts to reduce murders and non-fatal shootings.

The second important task of the Action Teams was to provide critical evaluation and feedback of projects being developed by City officials, law enforcement agencies, and/or other community groups or agencies that were related to the aims and scope of the Strategic Command. The Action Teams served an important role in catalyzing inter-agency communication and stimulating more rapid progress toward the development of these important projects. The Strategic Command's catalyst role was achieved through the Action Teams, which created a forum where diverse stakeholders from an array of backgrounds came together to share ideas, provide feedback about on-going efforts, and created bonds that led to better inter-agency communication and cooperation. Although the specific action steps and action items discussed in these meetings may not have originated within the Strategic Command, the Action Teams played an important role in moving these items forward to implementation. Furthermore, through this process, existing programs and services were expanded or enhanced through the Action Teams.

For example, the Criminal Justice Action Team created a monthly forum in which law enforcement agencies can share and critically discuss new initiatives within their respective agencies. The Action Team also served as a catalyst for promoting inter-agency cooperation and support for these initiatives at all levels of law enforcement.

Below, we highlight some of the specific action items that have been addressed in the various Action Teams that were fully or partially implemented as of year-end 2013. As noted before, not all of these items originated within an Action Team. However, Action Teams contributed to the discussion and development of these items through their meeting process and their role in creating a synergistic forum for diverse stakeholders to come together and share ideas and provide critical feedback about concepts that were being developed.

PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION - SCHOOL BASED YOUTH

Based on a recommendation that was generated by the Criminal Justice Action Team, formal policy procedures were established for NOPD to better utilize the street knowledge that school-based security officers and other key officials obtain about murders of school-aged youth. When murders involving school-aged youth occur, law enforcement's initial primary attention is focused on the crime scene. School security officers and other key school officials, who have established rapport with associates and school mates of the victim, often gain quick insight into the word on the street about the murder. These new procedures ensure that information about emerging feuds or altercations will be promptly communicated to detectives who can take necessary actions to prevent further violence.

This law enforcement policy was part of a three-pronged approach to working with school-aged youth who had been involved with violence, and in particular murder or non-fatal shootings, or who had experienced trauma resulting from these events. Part one was a strategic trauma response plan that was developed under the guidance of Former City Health Commissioner Dr. Karen De Salvo and community partners, including Metropolitan Human Services District, Children's Bureau, and local school districts. This component focused on response to acute crises in order to provide emotional and social support to trauma experiences. Meetings were held with charter schools to determine optimal strategies for implementing the plan in partnership. Part two was a mandate (developed by Commander Williams, New Orleans Police Department) that detectives contact school officials within 24 hours of the murder of a school-aged youth to systematically learn what is being said around campus about who was involved in the murder. This component was aimed at arrest and violence prevention intervention if retaliation was suspected. Part three was the development of a strategic plan to proactively encourage schools to channel information of potential violence outbreaks to law enforcement so that actions cold be taken to initiate prevention or intervention activities to stop violence before it occurs. This component also included identification of repeat truancy and curfew violators and implementation of specialized wraparound services. The primary aim of this component was prevention.

ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION

In cooperation with the New Orleans City Council and Neighborhood organizations, a list of nuisance properties in target neighborhoods was compiled under the direction of Deputy Mayor Emily Arata. Funding for more agents and resources was approved and alcoholic beverage reform ordinances were in the process of being implemented. Further, City enforcement officials- including the New Orleans Police Department, Law Department, Finance Department, and Department of Safety and Permits- partnered with State Alcohol and Tobacco Control agents to coordinate enforcement activities. Every month, two dozen enforcement officials gathered for enhanced training on laws that are applicable to alcoholic beverage outlets and for strategy sessions on how to address nuisance properties.

The Strategic Command catalyzed and improved multi-agency law enforcement deployment and cooperation against violent crime, especially with regard to the highest-risk individuals and groups. Inter-agency cooperation enabled law enforcement to more efficiently and directly share information from their respective intelligence surveillance, as well as to cooperatively bring monitoring and arrest of high-risk individuals and groups from multiple angles.

COORDINATED PROGRAMMING AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Through the Strategic Command Community Provider Action Team, CeaseFire New Orleans developed a repository of Community Provider agencies who would commit to accepting without delay any CeaseFire New Orleans participant who was referred to their agency, including provision of direct services, social services, survival resources, case management services, etc. The development of this resource referral expanded and enhanced CeaseFire New Orleans' capacity to effectively link their participants to needed programs and services, thus increasing the likelihood of program success. Participating agencies were allowed to advertise themselves as "CeaseFire New Orleans" partners who promote a message of unity against violence.

Related, in response to one of the identified challenges being faced by CeaseFire New Orleans and the Group Violence Reduction Strategy case managers in securing access and prioritization for NOLA FOR LIFE participants, and upon recommendation of the Community Action Team Workforce Workgroup, the New Orleans Workforce Investment Board (NOWIB) adopted a local workforce policy for Re-Entry Services that clearly defined the target population eligibility and establishes expectations for JOB1 Operators related to service standards, partnerships, linkages, and training.

RE-ENTRY

The Re-Entry Workgroup of the Community Action Team developed a detailed set of recommendations to develop, implement, and evaluate a specialized re-entry program for 16-30 year old individuals who had a history of violent crime, multiple firearms and/or drug arrests, or had been involved in a law enforcement defined high-risk group. This proposal made both programmatic and policy recommendations. Programmatic aspects of the proposal are being implemented in the City's Workforce Re-Entry pilot and the Group Violence Reduction Strategy programs.

Policy recommendations were being actively addressed as well. For example, HANO adopted a new criminal background policy in March 2013 that reduces barriers to federally funded housing for people with criminal histories. In January 2014, the Civil Service Commission and the City of New Orleans approved new procedures for reviewing applicants' criminal history. Applicants now will be considered for employment opportunities with the City of New Orleans based on the merits of their skills and experience related to the position for which they are applying. Although still required for City employment, the hiring department will be required to conduct interviews of all qualified applicants prior to requesting a criminal background check. Policies related to

expungement and reductions in court fines are being addressed under the lead of the Justice and Accountability Center.

COMMUNITY RESOURCE

The Strategic Command served as an important community resource for data and information about evidence-based practices related to murder and violence reduction. For example, Strategic Command data trend informed local, state, and federal law enforcement strategic planning and deployment of resources in New Orleans to reduce murder and other violent crime. Community-based and service organizations used Strategic Command data to inform development of specialized programs and services for high-risk youth served by their agencies.

During 2012-2013, Strategic Command team members contributed actively to several grant submissions, including the successful City of New Orleans' Workforce Re-Entry pilot and the National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention grant applications. The Strategic Command also prepared data reports for a variety of agencies, including the City of New Orleans analysis of Domestic Violence, Project CeaseFire and the CeaseFire Hospital Crisis Intervention Team, the Central City Renaissance Alliance, the Group Violence Reduction Strategy, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, the New Orleans Interfaith Peace Initiative, and Tulane University. The Strategic Command further participated in multiple site visits for funded projects including the National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention, Strong Cities Strong Communities, and a Re-Entry Research Project being jointly conducted by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Tulane University.

In 2013, Strategic Command was one of five programs recognized by the Center for Public Service at Tulane University for excellence in community service in its annual report to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and Community Engagement.

2014: STRATEGIC COMMAND TRANSITIONS TO THE OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATION (CITY OF NEW ORLEANS)

In 2014, the two core functions of the Strategic Command (murder and non-fatal trend analyses and convening key stakeholders from City, criminal justice, and community agencies) were transitioned to the City under the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination. When Strategic Command launched in 2012, the City did not have the capacity or necessary structures in place to conduct the in-depth analysis that the Strategic Command team has conducted over the last two years. In the time since the launch, staff in the Mayor's Office and Office of Criminal Justice Coordination have created the necessary structures and reporting mechanisms, and increased analytic capacity so that the key trend analysis functions can be transitioned to the City. Additionally, the City began convening members of the Action Teams in a variety of working groups and partnerships, including the Community of Practice, Reentry, the Behavioral Health Interagency Council, Group Violence Reduction Strategy Service Network, and others. The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination will continue to prepare and distribute consistent murder and non-fatal shooting trend analyses to stakeholders, and will reach an even wider audience by distributing to all the members in the working groups and partnership groups. The Criminal Justice Action Team will continue to convene to discuss murder and non-fatal shooting trends and to conduct the murder case reviews.

NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS

The Strategic Command had a particular focus in 2012-2013 on five neighborhoods in New Orleans, which have accounted for about one-third of all murders in the city over recent years: Central City, Little Woods, Seventh Ward, St. Claude, and St. Rock[2]. In this section, we contrast data on these five neighborhoods with data aggregated city-wide across a range of indicators, including:

- **Demographic Indicators**: Gender, race/ethnicity, and age distribution of residents
- **Economic Indicators**: Unemployment rate, percent of household earning a wage or salary, percent of residents living below the poverty line, percent of children living below the poverty line, percent of renters spending 30% or more of their income on rent, and housing vacancy
- **Other Indicators**: Educational attainment and percent of single parent families

NOTE: Data presented are the most recent available and may not reflect recent growth or changes in neighborhood indicators. Neighborhood indicator data is based on 2010 statistics, the most recent year for which data was available.

DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

Examining demographic indicators, the five target neighborhoods were similar in **gender** distribution to city-wide averages (see Graph 1 on page 21). The percent of residents who were women ranged from 50.4% to 54.4% across the target neighborhoods versus 51.6% citywide. However, there were significant differences in the **racial/ethnic** distribution of residents in the target neighborhoods versus citywide (see Graph 2 on page 21). The percent of residents who were African-American is significantly higher in the target neighborhoods than city-wide:

- **Central City** 72.4%
- **Little Woods** 92.6%
- **Seventh Ward** 87.4%
- **St. Claude** 81.1%
- **St. Roch** 86.8%
- **Citywide** 59.6%

Finally, the **age** distribution of residents in the five target neighborhoods also was similar to citywide age distributions (see Graph 3 on page 22). Citywide, about half (50.2%) of residents in New Orleans were under the age of 35, about two fifths (38.6%) were aged 35-64 years, and 11% were 65 years of age or older.

In sum, the target neighborhoods were similar to citywide age and gender distributions, but differed significantly in racial/ethnic distribution.

[2] For the purpose of the murder and non-fatal shooting analyses, we used NOPD definitions of neighborhood boundaries. Neighborhood indicator data is defined by GNOCDC and Healthy NOLA data. We acknowledge that there may be slight variations in the way that neighborhoods are defined by these entities.

Graph 1. Gender Distribution by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Graph 2. Race/Ethnicity Distribution by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Graph 3. Age Group Distribution by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

As shown in Graph 4 on page 23, estimated **unemployment rates** in the majority of target neighborhoods were significantly higher than citywide rates (see Table 2 on page 23 for a detailed summary). Not surprisingly, given the higher rates of unemployment, estimates of the percent of households in the target neighborhoods who **earned wage, salary, or self-employment income** were also lower than citywide estimates (see Graph 5 on page 24 for a detailed summary). The exception was Little Woods whose percentage of wage earners was similar to citywide percentages. Similarly, the **average annual household income** was significantly less in the five target neighborhoods ($20,000 to $32,000 lower in target neighborhoods; see Graph 6 on page 24).

Graph 4. Estimated Unemployment Rates by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Table 2. Estimated Unemployment Rates and Percent of Residents Earning a Salary or Wage by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide

Neighborhood	Unemployment Rates	Percent of Residents Earning a Salary, Wage, or Self-Employed Income
Central City	23.9%	68.1%
Little Woods	11.0%	83.7%
Seventh Ward	19.7%	74.0%
St. Claude	23.1%	75.1%
St. Roch	27.4%	64.4%
Citywide	**12.0%**	**85.5%**

Table derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014

Graph 5. Type of Household Income by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Graph 6. Average Annual Household Income by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Large disparities also were observed for the percent of **residents living below the poverty line** (8-25% higher in target neighborhoods), the percent of **children living below the poverty line** (12-36% higher), and the percent of **renters spending 30% or more of their household income on rent** (12-19% higher except Central City which was lower than the citywide percent; see Graph 7 below for summary).

Graph 7. Economic Indicators by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Finally, the percentage of **vacant housing units,** as well as the percentage of **owner occupied housing units,** in the target neighborhoods was about the same (Little Woods, St. Claude, St. Roch) or lower (Central City, Seventh Ward) than citywide (see Graph 8 on page 26).

In sum, several indicators highlighted large economic disparities in the five target neighborhoods compared to citywide, including higher rates of unemployment, lower percentage of residents earning a wage or salary, lower household income, and increased rates of people living below the poverty line.

Graph 8. Vacant and Owner Occupied Housing Units by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

OTHER INDICATORS

Graph 9 on page 27 illustrates large disparities in **educational attainment** in the target neighborhoods versus citywide (see Table 3 on page 27 for additional summary). The exception is Little Woods, which mirrors the citywide total for percent of residents without a high school degree or GED and exceeds citywide totals for percent of residents with a high school degree or equivalent. Although the percent of residents in Little Woods who have attended college approaches citywide totals, the percent of residents who have attained a degree is much lower.

Finally, the percent of households with **single parent mothers** was slightly higher than the citywide percent (range: 7-13% higher across target neighborhoods). Similarly, the percent of children **living with their grandparents** was 3-8% higher across the target neighborhoods (except for Little Woods which was slightly lower than the citywide percent). In contrast, the **percent of children living with married parents** was about twice as high citywide compared to the target neighborhoods, with slightly higher percentages observed in Little Woods (See Graph 10 on page 28 for detailed summary).

Consistent with the economic disparities between the target neighborhoods compared to citywide, we saw similar disparities in educational attainment. We also observed differences in the children's living situations with caretakers.

Graph 9. Educational Attainment by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide (Residents 18 Years of Age and Older)



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Table 3. Educational Attainment by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide (Residents 18 years of Age and Older)

Neighborhood	% Less than High School	% High School Degree or GED	% Some College	% College Degree (AA or Higher)
Central City	30.0	33.9	17.9	18.3
Little Woods	14.0	35.4	32.1	18.6
Seventh Ward	30.1	31.5	22.1	16.4
St. Claude	19.8	42.1	25.2	12.8
St. Roch	33.4	38.6	16.8	11.2
Citywide	**16.7**	**27.2**	**24.0**	**32.2**

Table derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Graph 10. Household Composition by Target Neighborhood versus Citywide



Graph derived from data obtained from the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/Orleans.html. Accessed January 16, 2014.

Red and Green Bars: These percentages do not add to 100% because this graph excluded children who lived with other relatives, children who lived with non-relatives, children who lived with their father only, and children who were heads of households. Denominator was based upon the number of households with children under 18, not the total number of households

Purple Bars: The percentage of households with a female householder with children under 18 is the percentage of those households out of ALL households in the area, including those without children. It is noted that most households did not contain people under the age of 18.

SUMMARY OF MURDER AND NON-FATAL SHOOTING ANALYSES 2012-2013

Data for the summary presented below were obtained primarily through analyses of NOPD Case Management reports. Additional information was obtained through NOPD's Motion database and the Orleans Parish Prison public access database.

In analyzing data related to murders and non-fatal shootings that occurred in 2012-2013, the Strategic Command focused on four content areas: incidence, contextual characteristics of murder and non-fatal shooting cases, victim characteristics, and suspect characteristics (based on cleared cases).

This report examines murder data from multiple perspectives:

- Citywide
- By Target neighborhoods (Central City, Little Woods, Seventh Ward, St. Claude, St. Roch) versus Non-Target neighborhoods (all other NOPD-defined neighborhoods in New Orleans)
- By whether the victim lived in the same neighborhood in which he/she was murdered/non-fatally shot or whether the victim was murdered/non-fatally shot outside of his/her neighborhood of residency
- By age (0-12, 13-20, 21-29, 30+)

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Reporting Dates and Inclusion Criteria

1. Data analyzed in this report included all murders and non-fatal shootings that occurred in New Orleans from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2013. Not included in these analyses were other types of fatal and non-fatal shootings that occurred in New Orleans in 2012-2013, including: justifiable homicides and shootings, accidental homicides and shootings, suicides, and officer-related fatalities and shootings.

2. We also do not include 2012-2013 deaths that resulted from incidents which occurred in prior years (e.g., someone who was shot in 2011 but did not die from these wounds until 2012). NOPD annual reports do include murders resulting from prior years. Thus, there may be minor differences in their annual totals versus the numbers listed in this report.

3. Data were accurate as of January 6, 2014. More recent information about 2012-2013 murder and non-fatal shooting cases that may have emerged after this date are not included in this report.

Analytic Decision Rules

1. Both primary and secondary factors were reported for all motive-related data. Thus, percent totals may add up to more than 100%. Similarly, percent totals for weapons may exceed 100% as multiple weapons were used in some cases. In all analyses, percent totals may not add up exactly to 100% due to rounding.

2. Formal statistical analyses were conducted to explore for differences between years (2012-2013), target versus non-target neighborhood, whether the victim lived where he/she was murdered or not, and victim age (13-20, 21-29, 30+)[3]. Only statistically significant differences are reported ($p<.05$). Between-group analyses exclude cases in which data (e.g., age, race\ethnicity) are missing or unknown.

3. Given the large number of categories for police district, zip code, and neighborhood, we did not perform formal statistical analyses for these variables. However, we have tabled these data across years and noted percentage changes from 2012 to 2013.

4. For the purposes of this report, public space is defined as "any murder or non-fatal shooting which occurred outside a building or a private yard" (e.g., street, park, front yard, vehicle).

5. A murder or non-fatal shooting was designated "known to be related to a separate murder incident" if specified in an NOPD case management report.

6. Gang-member involvement is in accordance with official NOPD designation for the case. Gang member involvement could include the victim-only, suspect-only, or both. Gang member involvement data were not available for 2012 cases. Thus, data are presented only for 2013 cases.

7. Prior arrest and conviction data for drug- and gun-related crimes only reflect adult charges. Juvenile arrests and convictions are not included in these data. Thus, these data are likely an under report of the percentage of victims and suspects who have ever been arrested in their lifetime.

   For 2013 murder cases and non-fatal shooting cases, prior arrest and conviction data were obtained from NOPD's Motion database and the Orleans Parish Prison public access database of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court proceedings. For 2012 murder cases, prior arrest and conviction data were obtained only from the Orleans Parish Prison public access database, which does not capture charges brought in Municipal and Traffic Courts. Thus, for comparisons of arrests and convictions by year, we are limiting our analyses to Orleans Parish Prison public access data only to keep the 2012-2013 data sources comparable.

[3]Chi-Square statistics were performed on categorical outcomes; t-test statistics were performed on continuous outcomes.

If we examine only 2013 data, eliminating the additional information obtained from NOPD's Motion database results in reductions in the percentage of victims who were ever (does not include juvenile arrests and convictions):

- arrested (-9.1%);
- arrested on a drug charge (-3.2%);
- arrested on a gun-related charge (-5.2%); and/or
- convicted of a gun-related charge (-0.7%).

Similarly, examining only the Orleans Parish Prison database for 2013 resulted in a reduction of the percentage of suspects who were ever

- arrested (-14.3 %);
- arrested on a drug charge (-12.6%); and/or
- arrested on a gun-related charge (-8.2%).

There was no difference in the percentage convicted of a gun-related charge.

Given that analyses of 2012 non-fatal shooting cases were done retrospectively during the 2013 calendar year, we did not systematically collect data about arrests and convictions for 2012 non-fatal shooting victims and suspects. Thus, these data will be reported for 2013 only in the non-fatal shooting analyses.

8. Victims under the age of 13 (n=9 murders; 13 non-fatal shootings) were excluded from analyses of victim characteristics. There were no suspects under the age of 13.

9. Suspect demographic data (e.g., race, gender) is unduplicated. If a suspect was involved in more than one case, that suspect demographic information was only counted once.

10. Clearance rates were calculated on the number of individual 2012 and 2013 murder cases that were cleared by NOPD as of January 6, 2014. For example, a cleared double murder would count as two separate cases for the purpose of calculating clearance rates. Prior year murders (e.g., 2011) cleared in 2012-2013 were not included in this rate. Thus, our numbers will be lower than the clearance rates provided by NOPD to the national reporting system.

MURDERS 2012-2013

Murder Incidence

From January 1, 2012-December 31, 2013, there were 346 murder victims in New Orleans (322 incidents, including 3 triple murders and 18 double murders; see Map 1 on page 80 for GIS plot of all murders by location). In 23.4% of the incidents, one or more other people were fatally or non-fatally shot. Examining the number of murders by year, 193 murders occurred in 2012 (179 incidents, including 2 triple murders and 10 double murders). In 2013, there were 153 murders (143 incidents, including 1 triple murder and 8 double murders). Thus, there was a 20.7% reduction in the number of murders from 2012 to 2013. More longitudinally, from 2007 (n=208) to 2013 (n=153), there was a 26.4% reduction in murders (average: 183.1 per year; see Graph 11 below).

Graph 11. Number of Murders by Year, 2007-2013



Graph 12 on page 33 shows that monthly murder totals ranged from a high of 26 in January 2012 to a low of 6 in February 2012. The 2012-2013 monthly average was 14.5 murders.

Graph 12. Number of Murders by Month, 2012-2013



As seen in Graph 13 (page 34; see Table 4 on page 50 for detailed list), murders were relatively evenly dispersed across police districts with the exception of District 8 (Districts 1-7, range: 11.8%-20.2%; District 8: 0.6%) (see Map 2 on page 81 for a map of NOPD police districts). There was at least one murder in all New Orleans zip codes except 70148 (see Map 3 on page 82 for a map of New Orleans Zip Codes). Nine zip codes accounted for 20 or more murders across the two-year period (accounting for 76.9% of all murders); eight other zip codes accounted for 1-19 murders each (see Table 5 on page 50 for detailed list).

During 2012-2013, at least one murder occurred in 57 different neighborhoods (see Table 6 on page 51 for neighborhoods with 10 or more murder victims across the two years). About one-third (33.8%) of the victims were murdered in one of the five target neighborhoods (see Graph 14 on page 34; see Maps 4-8 on page 83-87 for GIS plot of murder locations within each target neighborhood). Yet, only 27.5% of victims last known home address was in a target neighborhood (see Graph 15 on page 35). In addition to the 95 victims who resided in a target neighborhood, 212 people from 52 other neighborhoods were murder victims (range 1-12). Additionally, there were 32 victims who resided outside of New Orleans, 2 individuals who were homeless and 5 victims whose address remains unknown. We also examined whether victims were murdered in the same neighborhood in which they lived. In all, over half of the victims (55.8%) were murdered in a different neighborhood from which they lived (see Graph 16 on page 35).

Graph 13. Distribution of Murders by Police District 2012-2013



Graph 14. Number of Murder Incidents and Victims by Target versus Non-Target Neighborhood, 2012-2013



Graph 15. Percent of Murder Victims by Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013



Graph 16. Percent of Victims Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Murder Occurred, 2012-2013



Similarly, Graph 17 (below) shows that only 26.1% of murder suspects' last known home address was in a target neighborhood, over half of whom lived in Little Woods (22/41). No other New Orleans neighborhood accounted for 7 or more suspect home addresses. In addition to the 41 murder suspects who resided in a target neighborhood, 94 people from 42 other neighborhoods were murder suspects (neighborhood range 1-6 suspects). Additionally, there were 16 suspects who resided outside of New Orleans, 4 suspects whose address remains unknown, and one suspect who was homeless. Slightly over one-fourth (28.0%) of suspects lived in the same neighborhood in which the murder occurred (see Graph 18 on page 37).

Graph 17. Percent of Murder Suspects by Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013



Graph 18. Percent of Suspects Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Murder Occurred, 2012-2013



Murder Contextual Environment

Murders were distributed across the days of the week (range: 12.4% to 18.5% across days; see Graph 19 on page 38. About two-thirds (67.1%) of murders occurred between noon and midnight (see Graph 20 on page 38).

As shown in Graph 21 (page 39), about three-fourths (77.8%) of the murders occurred in a public space (see page 3, rule number 4 for the definition of public space). The most common murder locations were on the street (46.5%), in a home or apartment (21.4%), or in a vehicle (16.5%). No other location accounted for more than 5% of murder locations. Guns, predominantly handguns, were the primary murder weapon in most murders (79.5%; see Graph 22 on page 39). Graph 23 on page 40 shows that the most common motives were argument (21.4%), retaliation/feud (21.4%), drug-related (21.1%), and/or robbery (12.4%). No other motive exceeded 6.0% of cases. It is also noted that no motive was identified in a nearly a third (29.2%) of the cases. If we examine only those cases with an identified motive, 80.0% of cases were attributed to retaliation/feud, drugs, and/or an argument. Further, slightly more than one in every eight cases (13.0%) was known to be related to a separate murder incident (see Graph 24 on page 40). In 2013, one-third of cases (37.3%) were designated as having gang member involvement (no data available for 2012).

Graph 19. Murder Case Distribution by Day of the Week, 2012-2013



Graph 20. Murder Case Distribution by Time of Day, 2012-2013



Graph 21. Murder Cases by Location, 2012-2013



Graph 22. Weapons Used in Murder Cases, 2012-2013



****May add up to >100% due to multiple types of weapons being used in a case.**

Graph 23. Identified Motives in Murder Cases, 2012-2013



Graph 24. Murder Was Known To Be Associated With A Separate Murder Incident



Murder Victims

As illustrated in Graph 25 (below) and Graph 26 (page 42), victims were predominantly male (88.2%) and African-American (91.9%). Across all victims, the mean age was 30.0 years (median: 27.0, range: 1-99). About one-fifth of victims (19.7%) were under the age of 21, 36.7% were aged 21-29, 43.6% were aged 30 years of age or older (see Graph 27 on page 42).

The majority of victims had a documented history of ever being arrested (79.8%; see Graph 28 on page 43), about half had ever been arrested on a drug-related charge (54.6%; see Graph 29 on page 43), slightly less than a third had ever been arrested on a gun-related charge (30.3%; see Graph 30 on page 44), and 12.4% had been convicted of a gun-related charge (see Graph 31 on page 44).

Graph 25. Percent of Murder Victims by Gender, 2012-2013



Graph 26. Percent of Murder Victims by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013



Graph 27. Percent of Murder Victims by Age Group, 2012-2013



Graph 28. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2012-2013



Graph 29. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2012-2013



Graph 30. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013



Graph 31. Percent of Murder Victims Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013



Murder Suspects (based on cleared 2012-2013 cases through January 6, 2014)

As seen in Graph 32 (below), 37.6% of murders that occurred in 2012-2013 were cleared as of January 6, 2014 (includes cases cleared by arrest, warrant, or indictment; officer-related shooting; or suicide)[4]. Almost half (44.5%) of the murdered victims had no identified suspects as of this date, while 17.9% of murder victims had an identified suspect who had not yet been charged. In all, 157 unique suspects had been arrested for 2012-2013 murders as of January 6, 2014. These arrests cleared 129 murder victims across 119 unique incidents.

Graph 32. Percent of Cleared Murder Cases, 2012-2013 (Through January 6, 2014)



As shown in Graph 33 (page 46), most suspects who were arrested for a murder that occurred in 2012-2013 were male (86.6%) and African-American (94.9%; see Graph 34 on page 46). Over two-fifths of the suspects (42.0%) were under the age of 21 (median=22.0 years; mean=24.0 years; range: 14-55) (see Graph 35 on page 47). We also examined the age difference of victims and suspects (see Graph 36 on page 47). Two-thirds (65.5%) of suspects were younger than their victims, 6.5% were the same age, and 28.0% were older than their victims. On average, suspects were 5.1 years younger than their victim (median: 5.0 years younger; range: -48 to +38 years).

[4]**NOPD's reported clearance rate is higher that the percentages listed in this report. NOPD includes murder incidents occurring prior to 2012 but which were cleared in 2012-2013 in their clearance rate which was not done in this report. This report focuses only on murder incidents taking place from 2012-2013 which were cleared as of January 6, 2014.**

Graph 33. Percent of Murder Suspects by Gender, 2012-2013

Graph 34. Percent of Murder Suspects by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013



Graph 35. Percent of Murder Suspects by Age Group, 2012-2013



Graph 36. Relative Age of Murder Suspect versus Victim, 2012-2013



The majority of suspects had a documented history of ever being arrested (79.6%; see Graph 37 below), about half had ever been arrested on a drug-related charge (52.9%; Graph 38 below), about two-fifths had ever been arrested on a gun-related charge (39.5%; see Graph 39 on page 49), and 13.4% had been convicted of a gun-related charge (see Graph 40 on page 49).

Graph 37. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2012-2013



Graph 38. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2012-2013



Graph 39. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013



Graph 40. Percent of Murder Suspects Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2012-2013



BETWEEN-GROUP ANALYSES OF MURDERS

Differences by Year

Incidence

- From 2012 to 2013, reductions in the number of murders were observed in police districts 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (see Table 4 below). There was an increase in police districts 2 and 3. Police district 8 recorded one murder in both 2012 and 2013.
- Among zip codes with 20 or more murders from 2012 to 2013, there were decreases in the number of murders in zip codes 70114, 70117, 70118, 70119, 70126, and 70127 (see Table 5 below) (see map 2 on page 81 for map of New Orleans zip code boundaries). Increases were observed in zip codes 70122 and 70125, while no change occurred in zip code 70116.

Table 4. Number of Murders and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Police District

Police District	# of Murders-2012	# of Murders-2013	% Difference
1 (n=46)	27	19	-29.6%
2 (n=41)	20	21	+5.0%
3 (n=42)	17	25	+47.1%
4 (n=43)	26	17	-34.6%
5 (n=70)	46	24	-47.8%
6 (n=47)	24	23	-4.2%
7 (n=55)	32	23	-28.1%
8 (n=2)	1	1	0.0%
TOTAL (n=346)	**193**	**153**	**-20.7%**

Table 5. Number of Murders and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Zip Code

Zip Code	# of Murders-2012	# of Murders-2013	% Difference
70114 (n=31)	17	14	-17.7%
70116 (n=28)	14	14	0.0%
70117 (n=43)	26	17	-34.6%
70118 (n=27)	17	10	-41.2%
70119 (n=46)	27	19	-29.6%
70122 (n=22)	8	14	+75.0%
70125 (n=25)	9	16	+77.8%
70126 (n=23)	12	11	-8.3%
70127 (n=21)	15	6	-60.0%
8 Zip Codes: <20 (n=80)	48 (8 zip codes)	32 (7 zip codes)	-33.4%
TOTAL (n=346)	**193**	**153**	**-20.7%**

- Among neighborhoods with 10 or more murders from 2012 to 2013, there were decreases in the number of murders in Behrman, Central City, Little Woods, St. Claude, St. Roch, the 7th Ward, and Treme (see Table 6 below). No change was observed in Gert Town or Mid-City.

Table 6. Number of Murders and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Neighborhood Where Incident Occurred

Neighborhood	# of Murders-2012	# of Murders-2013	% Difference
Behrman (n=17)	11	6	-45.5%
Central City (n=29)	16	13	-18.7%
Gert Town (n=12)	6	6	0.0%
Little Woods (n=27)	17	10	-41.2%
Mid-City (n=10)	5	5	0.0%
St. Claude (n=11)	9	2	-77.8%
St. Roch (n=16)	10	6	-40.0%
Seventh Ward (n=34)	19	15	-21.1%
Treme (n=14)	9	5	44.4%
52 Other NO Neighborhoods (n=202)	106	96	-9.4%
TOTAL (n=346)	**193**	**153**	**-20.7%**

Context

- A higher percentage of murder cases in 2012 (19.7%) were known to be related to a separate murder case than in 2013 (4.6%), $X^2(1)=17.23$, $p<.001$.

Victims

- The percent of murder victims who had ever been arrested was higher in 2012 (83.9%) than 2013 (74.5%), $X^2(1)=4.70$, $p<.05$.

Suspects

- There were no significant differences by in suspect characteristics between years.

Differences by Target Neighborhood

Context

- Murder incidents that occurred in a target neighborhood (30.8%) were more likely to include another fatal or non-fatal shooting victim than murder incidents in a non-target neighborhood (19.7%), $X^2(1)=5.34$, $p<.05$.

Victims

- Murder victims were more likely to have ever been arrested on a drug-related charge if they lived in a target (61.5%) versus non-target neighborhood (51.1%), $X^2(1)=3.41$, $p<.05$

Suspects

- There were no significant differences in suspect characteristics between target versus non-target neighborhoods.

Differences by the Whether Victim Lived in the Same neighborhood in Which (S)He Was Murdered

Context

- 2013 murder cases were less likely to be designated as gang member involved when the victim lived in the neighborhood in which s(he) was murdered (27.4%) than when the victim did not live in the neighborhood in which (s)he was murdered (44.3%), $X^2(1)=4.44$, $p<.05$. [Gang member involvement data for 2012 is unavailable]
- Among murders with an identified motive, a smaller percentage of murders were attributed to an argument, feud, retaliation, and/or drugs when the victim lived in the same neighborhood in which the incident occurred (72.6%) than when the victim did not live in the same neighborhood where the murder occurred (86.4%), $X^2(1)=7.08$, $p=.006$.
- Murders in which the victim lived in the same neighborhood in which the incident occurred (83.1%) were less likely to be associated with a separate murder incident than incidents in which the victim did not live in the same neighborhood as the murder (96.9%), $X^2(1)=19.26$, $p<.001$.

Victims

- Women accounted for a higher percentage of cases in which the victim lived in the same neighborhood in which (s)he was murdered (17.6%) than in cases in which the victim did not live in the same neighborhood in which (s)he was murdered (7.3%), $X^2(1)=8.61$, $p=.003$.
- Victims who were murdered in their neighborhood of residence (mean=31.7 years) were, on average, 3.0 years older than victims who were murdered outside of their neighborhood of residency (mean=28.8 years), $t(1,339)=4.42$, $p<.05$.

Suspects

- There were no significant differences in suspect characteristics by whether the suspect lived in the same neighborhood in which the murder occurred.

Differences by Age

Context

- There was a significant difference in the pattern of murders across day of the week. Over half of victims aged 13-20 (50.8%) were murdered on a Sunday or Monday compared to victims aged 21-29 (27.5%) and victims aged 30+ years (31.8%), $X^2(12)=21.28$, $p<.05$ (see Table 7 below) for complete distribution across days by age).

Table 7. Percent of Murders Within Age Group By Day of the Week 2012-2013

	13-20	21-29	30+	Total
Sunday	23.7%	11.8%	13.9%	14.8%
Monday	27.1%	15.7%	17.9%	18.7%
Tuesday	13.6%	17.3%	13.2%	14.8%
Wednesday	3.4%	13.4%	13.9%	11.9%
Thursday	8.5%	10.2%	18.5%	13.6%
Friday	15.3%	13.4%	11.3%	12.8%
Saturday	8.5%	18.1%	11.3%	13.4%

- A higher percentage of victims lived in the neighborhood in which (s)he was murdered among victims aged 13-20 years (50.0%) or 30+ years (50.0%) compared to victims aged 21-29 (30.6%), $X^2(2)=11.89$, $p=.003$.
- The percentage of murder cases known to be associated with a separate murder incident declined with age (13-20: 20.3%; 21-29: 15.7%; 30+: 8.6%), $X^2(2)=6.06$, $p<.05$.
- Among murders with an identified motive, a greater percentage of murders were attributed to an argument, feud, retaliation, and/or drugs when the victim was aged 13-20 (91.4%) than when the victim was aged 21-29 (86.5%) or 30+ (74.1) years, $X^2(2)=7.78$, $p<.05$.
- A higher percentage of cases were gun-related fatalities among 13-20 (96.6%) and 21-29 (97.6%) year old victims than among victims 30 years of age or older (85.4%), $X^2(2)=16.02$, $p<.001$.
- 2013 murders in which the victim was 13-20 (44.4%) or 21-29 (51.9%) years of age were more likely to be designated as gang member involved than murders in which the victim was 30 years of age or older (23.5%), $X^2(2)=10.95$, $p=.004$.

Victims

- Murder victims aged 13-20 (25.4%) were less likely to have ever been arrested (66.1%) than older victims (21-29: 86.6%; 30+: 83.4%), $X^2(2)=11.91$, $p=.003$. Murder

victims aged 13-20 also were less likely to have ever been arrested for a drug-related charge (25.4%) than victims aged 21-29 (61.4%) or 30+ (62.9%) years, $X^2(2)=26.80$, $p<.001$. These two findings remain significant if we compare only 18-20 year old victims to older victims to control for juvenile status of victims under the age of 17.

Suspects

- There were no significant differences in suspect characteristics by age.

NON-FATAL SHOOTINGS 2012-2013

Non-Fatal Shooting Incidence

From January 1, 2012-December 31, 2013, there were 696 non-fatal shooting victims in New Orleans (549 incidents, including 98 incidents in which two or more people were non-fatally shot; range 2-19; see Map 9 on page 88 for GIS plot of all non-fatal shootings by location). Examining the number of non-fatal shootings by year, 373 non-fatal shootings occurred in 2012 (298 incidents, including 55 incidents in which two or more people were non-fatally shot; range 2-6 victims). In 2013, there were 323 non-fatal shootings (251 incidents, including 43 incidents in which two or more people were non-fatally shot; range 2-19). Thus, there was a 13.4% reduction in the number of non-fatal shootings from 2012 to 2013. More longitudinally, there was a 23.8% reduction in non-fatal shootings from 2009 (n=424) to 2013 (n=323) (average: 387.0 per year; see Graph 41 below).

Graph 41. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings, 2009-2013



Graph 42 on page 56 shows that monthly non-fatal shooting totals ranged from a high of 46 in January 2012 to a low of 12 in December 2013. The 2012-2013 monthly average was 29.0 non-fatal shootings.

Graph 42. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings By Month, 2012-2013



As seen in Graph 43 (on page 57; see Table 8 on page 74 for detailed list), non-fatal shootings were relatively evenly dispersed across police districts with the exception of District 8 (Districts 1-7, range: 8.2%-18.5%; District 8: 2.7%) (see Map 2 on page 81 for NOPD police district boundaries). There was at least one non-fatal shooting in all New Orleans zip codes except 70124 and 70148. Nine zip codes accounted for 40 or more non-fatal shootings across the two-year period (accounting for 76.1% of all non-fatal shootings); seven other zip codes accounted for 15-38 non-fatal shootings each (see Table 9 on page 75 for a detailed list).

During 2012-2013, at least one non-fatal shooting occurred in 58 different neighborhoods (see Table 10 on page 75 for neighborhoods with 20 or more non-fatal shooting victims across the two years). About one-third (35.6%) of the victims were non-fatally shot in one of the five target neighborhoods (see Graph 44 on page 57; see Maps 10-14 on pages 89-93 for GIS plot of non-fatal shooting locations within each target neighborhood). Yet, only 30.2% of victims last known home address was in a target neighborhood (neighborhoods (see Graph 45 on page 58). In addition to the 248 victims who resided in a target neighborhood, 390 people from 53 other neighborhoods were non-fatal shooting victims (range 1-22). Additionally, there were 53 victims who resided outside of New Orleans, 1 individual who was homeless and 4 victims whose address remains unknown. We also examined whether victims were non-fatally shot in the same neighborhood in which they lived. In all, over half of the victims (55.6%) were non-fatally shot in a different neighborhood from which they lived (see Graph 46 on page 58).

Graph 43. Distribution of Non-Fatal Shootings by Police District, 2012-2013



Graph 44. Number of Non-Fatal Shooting Incidents and Victims by Target versus Non-Target Neighborhood, 2012-2013



Graph 45. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims By Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013



Graph 46. Percent of Victims Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Non-Fatal Shooting Occurred, 2012-2013



Similarly, Graph 47 (below) shows that only 24.5% of suspects' last know home address was in a target neighborhood (Little Woods was the only neighborhood in which more than 10 suspects lived; n=14). In addition to the 38 suspects who resided in a target neighborhood, 95 people from 42 other neighborhoods were non-fatal shooting suspects (range 1-6). Additionally, there were 16 suspects who resided outside of New Orleans, 2 individuals who were homeless and 4 victims whose address remains unknown. Slightly over one-fourth of suspects (29.0%) lived in the same neighborhood in which the non-fatal shooting occurred (see Graph 48 on page 60).

Graph 47. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects By Last Known Home Address, 2012-2013



Graph 48. Percent of Suspects Who Lived in the Neighborhood in Which the Non-Fatal Shooting Occurred, 2012-2013



CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT

Non-fatal shootings were distributed across the days of the week (see Graph 49 on page 61). About three-fourths (76.0%) of non-fatal shootings occurred between noon and midnight (see Graph 50 on page 61).

As shown in Graph 51 on page 62, most (90.7%) of the non-fatal shootings occurred in a public space (see page 3, rule number 4 for the definition of public space). The most common non-fatal shooting locations were on the street (69.1%), in a vehicle (12.2%), or in a home or apartment (8.0%). All other locations accounted for less than 10% of non-fatal shootings, collectively. Among cases in which the type of firearm was specified, handguns (68.8%) were the most common type of firearm used in non-fatal shootings (see Graph 52 on page 62). We further note that in about one-third of the cases (29.3%), the type of gun used was not specified at the time of the incident. In four-fifths of cases (80.3%), no motive has been identified. Graph 53 on page 63 shows that the most common identified motives were drug-related (9.2%), retaliation/feud (9.2%), argument (8.9%), and/or robbery (8.0%). No other motive exceeded 2% of cases with an identified motive. If we examine only those non-fatal shooting cases with an identified motive (n=232), about three-fourths (77.2%) of cases were attributed to feud/retaliation, drugs, and/or an argument. Further, slightly more than one in every 20 (5.5%) non-fatal shooting cases was known to be related to a separate murder incident (see Graph 54 on page 63). In 2013, one-third of non-fatal cases (35.0%) were designated as having definitive (19.2%) or likely (15.8%) gang member involvement.

Graph 49. Non-Fatal Shooting Case Distribution by Day of the Week, 2012-2013



Graph 50. Non-Fatal Shooting Case Distribution by Time of Day, 2012-2013



Graph 51. Non-Fatal Shooting Cases by Location, 2012-2013



Graph 52. Type of Firearm Used in Non-Fatal Shooting Cases, 2012-2013



****May add up to >100% due to multiple types of weapons being used in a case.**

Graph 53. Identified Motives in Non-Fatal Shooting Cases, 2012-2013



Graph 54. Non-Fatal Shooting Was Known to be Related to A Separate Murder Incident



Non-Fatal Shooting Victims

As illustrated in Graph 55 (below), victims were predominantly male (87.9%) and African-American (93.8%; see Graph 56 on page 65). Across all victims, the mean age was 25.5 years (median: 23.0, range: 4-67). Over one-third of victims (37.7%) were under the age of 21, 35.5% were aged 21-29, 26.6% were 30 years of age or older (see Graph 57 on page 65). Two victims' age remain unknown.

Graph 55. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims by Gender, 2012-2013



Graph 56. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013



Graph 57. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims By Age Group, 2012-2013



As shown in Graph 58 (below), for victims of non-fatal shootings in 2013, about three-fourths had ever been arrested (71.2%), while almost half (46.7%) had ever been arrested on a drug-related charge (see Graph 59 on page 67). About one-third (32.5) of 2013 non-fatal shooting victims had ever been arrested on a gun-related charge (see Graph 60 on page 67), while 13.0% had ever been convicted of a gun-related charge (see Graph 61 on page 68). Data about prior arrests and convictions were not collected for 2012 non-fatal shooting victims.

Graph 58. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2013



Graph 59. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2013



Graph 60. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2013



Graph 61. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Victims Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2013



NON-FATAL SHOOTING SUSPECTS (cleared cases through January 6, 2014)

As seen in Graph 62 (page 69), 24.3% of non-fatal shooting cases that occurred during 2012-2013 were cleared as of January 6, 2014 (includes cases cleared by arrest, warrant, or indictment; officer-related shooting; or suicide)[5]. Almost three-fourths (73.1%) of the cases had no identified suspects as of this date, while 2.6% of cases had an identified suspect who had not yet been charged. In all, 155 unique suspects had been arrested for non-fatal shootings that occurred during 2012-2013 as of January 6, 2014. These arrests cleared 172 non-fatal shooting victims across 116 unique incidents.

Most suspects who were arrested for a 2012-2013 non-fatal shooting were male (90.3%) and African-American (95.5%) (see Graph 63 on page 69 and Graph 64 on page 70). Over two-fifths of the suspects (45.2%) were under the age of 21 and 82.0% were under the age of 30 (median=21.0 years; mean=24.3 years; range: 14-62) (see Graph 65 on page 70). We also examined the age difference of victims and suspects (see Graph 66 on page 71). Half (49.8%) of suspects were younger than their victims, 10.0% were the same age, and 40.3% were older than their victims. On average, suspects were 2.1 years younger than their victim (median: 0.0 years younger; range: -42 to +34 years).

[4]**NOPD's reported clearance rate is higher that the percentages listed in this report. NOPD includes murder incidents occurring prior to 2012 but which were cleared in 2012-2013 in their clearance rate which was not done in this report. This report focuses only on murder incidents taking place from 2012-2013 which were cleared as of January 6, 2014.**

Graph 62. Percent of Cleared Non-Fatal Shooting Cases, 2012-2013 (Through January 6, 2014)



Graph 63. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects by Gender, 2012-2013



Graph 64. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects by Race and Ethnicity, 2012-2013



Graph 65. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects by Age Group, 2012-2013



Graph 66. Relative Age of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspect versus Victim, 2012-2013



As shown in Graph 67 (page 72), about two-thirds of 2013 non-fatal shooting suspects had ever been arrested (66.2%). About one-third (31.0%) of the suspects had ever been arrested on a drug-related charge (see Graph 68 on page 72). About one-third of suspects (35.2%) had ever been arrested on a gun-related charge (see Graph 69 on page 73); while 16.9% had ever been convicted of a gun-related charge (see Graph 70 on page 73). Data were not collected on prior arrests and convictions for 2012 non-fatal shooting suspects.

Graph 67. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested, 2013



Graph 68. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Drug-Related Charge, 2013



Graph 69. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Arrested on a Gun-Related Charge, 2013



Graph 70. Percent of Non-Fatal Shooting Suspects Who Had Ever Been Convicted of a Gun-Related Charge, 2013



BETWEEN-GROUP ANALYSES OF NON-FATAL SHOOTINGS

Differences by Year

Incidence

- From 2012 to 2013, reductions in the number of non-fatal shootings were observed in police districts 1, 2, 6 and 7 (see Table 8 below). There were increases in police districts 3, 4, 5, and 8.
- Among zip codes with 40 or more non-fatal shootings from 2012 to 2013, there were decreases in the number of non-fatal shootings in zip codes 70118, 70119, 70125, and 70126 (see Table 9 on page 75). Increases were observed in zip codes 70013, 70014, 70116, 70017, and 70122.
- Among neighborhoods with 20 or more non-fatal shootings from 2012 to 2013, there were decreases in the number of non-fatal shootings in Central City, Gentilly Terrace, Gert Town Hollygrove, Little Woods, Mid-City, St. Roch, and Treme (see Table 10 on page 75). There also was a decrease in the number of non-fatal shootings in St. Claude, although the cumulative number of shootings for 2012-2013 was under 20. An increase in the number of non-fatal shootings occurred in the 7th Ward.

Table 8. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Police District

Police District	# of Non-Fatal Shootings-2012	# of Non-Fatal Shootings-2013	% Difference
1 (n=98)	58	40	-31.0%
2 (n=76)	46	30	-34.8%
3 (n=82)	35	47	+34.3%
4 (n=57)	24	33	+37.5%
5 (n=129)	54	75	+38.9%
6 (n=121)	74	47	-36.5%
7 (n=114)	75	39	-48.0%
8 (n=19)	7	12	+71.4%
TOTAL (n=696)	**373**	**323**	**-13.4%**

Context

- In 2013 (9.3%), a higher percentage of non-fatal shooting cases were known to be related to a separate murder case than in 2012 (2.1%), $X^2(1)=17.11$, $p<.001$.

Victims

- There were no significant differences in victim characteristics by year.

Table 9. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Zip Code

Zip Code	# of Non-Fatal Shootings-2012	# of Non-fatal Shootings-2013	% Difference
70113 (n=51)	25	26	+4.0%
70114 (n=42)	18	24	+33.3%
70116 (n=61)	21	40	+90.5%
70117 (n=62)	30	32	+6.7%
70118 (n=48)	30	18	-40.0%
70119 (n=90)	51	39	-23.5%
70122 (n=51)	22	29	+31.8%
70125 (n=64)	34	30	-11.8%
70126 (n=71)	36	35	-2.8%
7 Zip Codes: <40 (n=156) (1 unknown)	106 (7 zip codes)	50 (7 zip codes) (1 unknown)	-52.8%
TOTAL (n=696)	**373**	**323**	**-13.4%**

Table 10. Number of Non-Fatal Shootings and Percentage Change from 2012 to 2013 by Neighborhood

NEIGHBORHOOD	# of Non-Fatal Shootings-2012	# of Non-fatal Shootings-2013	% Difference
Central City (n=79)	46	33	-28.2%
Gentilly Terrace (n=21)	11	10	-9.1%
Gert Town (n=22)	14	8	-42.9%
Hollygrove (n=21)	15	6	-40.0%
Little Woods (n=46)	33	13	-60.6%
Mid-City (n=22)	12	10	-16.7%
St. Claude (n=18)	11	7	-36.4%
St. Roch (n=34)	18	16	-11.1%
Seventh Ward (n=71)	29	42	+44.8%
Treme (n=25)	14	11	-21.4%
49 Other NO Neighborhoods (n=337)	170 (41 other NO neighborhoods)	167 (43 other NO neighborhoods)	-1.8%
TOTAL (n=696)	**373**	**323**	**-13.4%**

Suspects

- Suspects arrested for 2012 non-fatal shootings (mean=22.7 years) were, on average, about three years younger than suspects arrested for 2013 non-fatal shootings (mean=25.55 years), $t(1)=3.82$, $p<.05$.

- Women accounted for a lower percentage of people arrested for a non-fatal shooting in 2012 (6.0%) compared to 2013 (14.1%), $X^2(1)=2.91$, $p<.05$.

Differences by Target Neighborhood

Context

- 2013 non-fatal shootings that occurred in a target neighborhood (49.5%) were nearly twice as likely to be designated as a confirmed or likely gang member involved than 2013 non-fatal shootings that occurred in a non-target neighborhood (27.4%), $X^2(2)=18.09$, $p<.001$.
- Non-fatal shootings that occurred in a target neighborhood (10.5%) were more likely to be related to a separate murder incident than non-fatal shootings in a non-target neighborhood (2.7%), $X^2(1)=18.84$, $p<.001$.
- The percentage of non-fatal shootings that were cleared in target neighborhoods (31.0%) was higher than in non-target neighborhoods (20.5%), $X^2(1)=9.60$, $p=.002$.

Victims

- Women accounted for a larger percentage of non-fatal shootings in target neighborhoods (17.3%) than in non-target neighborhoods (9.2%), $X^2(1)=10.08$, $p=.001$.

Suspects

- There were no significant differences in suspect characteristics by target versus non-target neighborhood.

Differences by Whether the Victim Lived in the Same neighborhood in Which (S)He Was Non-Fatally Shot

Context

- When the victim lived in the same neighborhood in which the shooting occurred (versus when the victim did not), the non-fatal shooting location was more likely to be in a private residence (76.8% versus 23.2%) and less likely to occur on the street (42.0% versus 58.0%), $X^2(3)=39.57$, $p<.001$.
- In cases with an identified motive, a lower percentage of non-fatal shootings were attributed to retaliation/feud, argument, and/or drugs when the victim lived in the same neighborhood where the shooting (80.3%) occurred versus when the victim did not live in the same neighborhood (74.1%), $X^2(1)=1.28$, $p<.05$.

Victims

- Non-fatal shooting victims were more likely to live in the same neighborhood in which they were shot (60.3%) when the shooting occurred in a non-target neighborhood than when the shooting occurred in a target neighborhood (39.7%), $X^2(1)=4.05$, $p<.05$.

Suspects

- There were no significant differences in suspect characteristics by whether the suspect lived in the same neighborhood in which (s)he was shot.

Differences by Age

Context

- A higher percentage of victims aged 30+ years (41.6%) were shot in a target neighborhood than victims aged 13-20 (35.7%) or 21-29 (30.0%), $X^2(1)=6.35$, $p<.05$.
- The percent of non-fatal shooting cases known to be associated with a separate murder incident increased with age (13-20: 2.4%; 21-29: 6.1%; 30+: 8.1%), $X^2(2)=7.36$, $p<.05$.
- Among non-fatal shootings with an identified motive, more cases were attributed to an argument, feud, retaliation, and/or drugs when the victim was aged 13-20 (84.5%) or 21-29 (80.8%) years than when the victim was aged 30+ (66.7%) years, $X^2(2)=7.57$, $p<.05$.
- A larger percentage of cases were cleared among victims aged 30+ (29.7%) and 13-20 (26.5%) years than among victims aged 21-29 (15.8%) years, $X^2(2)=13.42$, $p=.001$.

Victims

- Women accounted for a larger percentage of non-fatal victims aged 30+ years (17.3%) than victims aged 13-20 (9.6%) or 21-29 (7.7%) years, $X^2(2)=10.71$, $p=.005$.
- The percentage of non-fatal shooting cases that were known to be associated with a separate murder incident was higher in cases involving victims aged 21-29 (6.1%) and aged 30+ (8.1%) than cases involving victims aged 13-20 (2.4%), $X^2(2)=7.36$, $p<.05$.
- Compared to older victims, a lower percentage of non-fatal shooting victims aged 13-20:
    - had ever been arrested (13-20: 52.8%; 21-29: 84.2%; 30+: 80.0%), $X^2(2)=30.0$, $p<.001$;
    - had ever been arrested for a drug-related charge (13-20: 24.5%; 21-29: 56.1%; 30+: 64.2%), $X^2(2)=36.43$, $p<.001$;
    - had ever been arrested for a gun-related charge (13-20: 17.9%; 21-29: 41.2%; 30+: 41.1%; $X^2(2)=17.07$, $p<.001$)
    - had ever been convicted for a gun-related charge (13-20: 7.5%; 21-29: 19.3%; 30+: 12.6%; $X^2(2)=6.62$, $p<.05$).

  If we compare just 18-20 year old suspects to older suspects, none of these arrest and conviction findings are significant. Thus, caution is urged with making definitive interpretations about differences between 13-20 year old suspects and older suspects given that data are only available about adult arrests and convictions. Juvenile arrest and conviction records are not included in these analyses.

Suspects

- The percentage of suspects who were women increased with age (13-20: 7.1%; 21-29: 10.5%; 30+: 14.3%), $X^2(2)=1.24$, $p<.05$.
- Compared to other suspects, a higher percentage of non-fatal shooting suspects aged 21-29 years
  - had ever been arrested (13-20: 55.6%; 21-29: 81.5%; 30+: 58.8%), $X^2(2)=4.60$, $p<.05$;
  - had ever been arrested for a drug-related charge (13-20: 11.1%; 21-29: 48.1%; 30+: 35.3%), $X^2(2)=8.85$, $p=.01$.
  - had ever been arrested for a gun-related charge (13-20: 29.6%; 21-29: 48.1%; 30+: 23.5%), $X^2(2)=3.37$, $p<.05$..

CONTACT INFORMATION FOR THIS REPORT

For further information about this report, contact:

David W. Seal, Ph.D.
Founding and Former Director of Research (2012-2013)
Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders, City of New Orleans

Professor, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine
1440 Canal Street, Tidewater Suite 2301
New Orleans, LA 70112
(O) 504-988-6260
(C) 414-614-3151
dseal@tulane.edu

CONTACT INFORMATION FOR THE MAYOR'S STRATEGIC COMMAND TO REDUCE MURDERS

Effective January 1, 2014, the activities of the Mayor's Strategic Command to Reduce Murders were transferred to the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination in the Mayor's Office (City of New Orleans). For further information about future activities and reports, contact:

Sarah Schirmer
Performance Management and Policy Lead
Mayor's Innovation Delivery Team
Office of Mayor Mitch Landrieu

1300 Perdido St.
Suite 8W03
New Orleans, LA 70112
slschirmer@nola.gov

MAPS: MURDER INCIDENTS

Map 1. GIS Map of Murder Locations, 2012-2013



Map 2. NOPD Police District Boundaries

Map 3. New Orleans Zip Code Boundaries



Map 4. GIS Map of Murder Locations- Central City, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 5. GIS Map of Murder Locations- Little Woods, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 6. GIS Map of Murder Locations- 7th Ward, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 7. GIS Map of Murder Locations- St. Claude, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 8. GIS Map of Murder Locations- St. Roch, 2012-2013

2012



2013



MAPS: NON-FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Map 9. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations, 2012-2013

Map 10. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- Central City, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 11. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- Little Woods, 2012-2013

2012

2013

Map 12. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- 7th Ward, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 13. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- St. Claude, 2012-2013

2012



2013



Map 14. GIS Map of Non-Fatal Shooting Locations- St. Roch, 2012-2013

2012



2013